National Transportation Safety Board
Aviation Incident Final Report
Paso Robles, CA
Date & Time:
11/07/2015, 1234 PST
CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22T
Landing gear collapse
Flight Conducted Under:
Part 91: General Aviation - Instructional
The student pilot was landing the airplane when, during the landing roll, the nose landing gear collapsed. Examination revealed that the nose landing gear had separated, and metallurgical testing showed that the failure was the result of high stress fatigue cracking due to sideways bending from one side. The crack was through the strut tube located at the forward edges (toes) of the gusset tube where it welds to the main strut tube. No other anomalies were identified with the landing gear. Further testing revealed that shimmy events or nonstandard towing procedures could result in the cracks and eventual separation of the nose gear. Similar incidents have occurred involving the same nosewheel design. As a result, the airplane manufacturer released a service bulletin to inspect for cracking and a service advisory related to appropriate towing procedures. Additionally, the manufacturer updated the design of the nose landing gear to increase the strength of the strut tube.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident to be:
The failure of the nose landing gear due to unanticipated fatigue loads.
Nose/tail landing gear - Fatigue/wear/corrosion (Cause)
Nose/tail landing gear - Design
Nose/tail landing gear - Capability exceeded (Cause)
***This report was modified on January 29, 2018. Please see the docket for this accident to view the original report.***
On November 7, 2015, at 1234 Pacific standard time, a Cirrus SR22T, N999VX, sustained minor damage during the landing roll at Paso Robles Airport, Paso Robles, California. The airplane was registered to PHD Ventures Inc., and operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The flight instructor, student pilot, and three passengers were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed.
According to the flight instructor, the student pilot was flying the airplane and the airplane touched down normally on the main gear. The student pilot then lowered the nose of the airplane and the nose landing gear collapsed.
Post incident examination revealed that the nose landing gear had separated. The nose landing gear consists of a main strut tube and two gusset tubes near the top portion of the main strut tube. The separation involved a crack beginning at the edge of the side gusset tubes weld to the main strut tube. Prior to the incident, a similar event had occurred, NTSB Incident WPR15IA252, and following this event, additional incidents occurred, including one in Japan.
The NTSB Materials Laboratory examined the nose landing gear strut and determined that the failure of the landing gear was the result of high stress fatigue cracking due to sideways bending from one side. No mechanical or metallurgical anomalies were noted with the landing gear.
On March 7, 2016, Cirrus Design Corporation issued Service Advisory Letter SA 16-03, which denoted the following:
Additionally, Cirrus Design Corporation performed structural testing of the nose landing gear.
Based on the data provided by the NTSB metallurgy lab, and a video of the Japan incident airplane experiencing nose landing gear shimmy 6 months before the nose gear collapsed, Cirrus explored two different methods of producing side loads in the nose landing gear. The first was through taxi and towing, the second through shimmy. Flight testing showed that significant side loads on the nose landing gear would develop during a shimmy event.
As a result of the testing, Cirrus did the following:
On April 12, 2016, Service Bulletin SB2X-32-22, "NOSE GEAR – Nose Landing Gear Strut Assembly Inspection," was released to inspect all the nose landing gear in the field for cracks in the welds between the strut tube and the LH and RH gusset tubes. In addition to the one-time inspection required by Service Bulletin SB2X-32-22, Cirrus added a post-shimmy inspection to Chapter 5-50 Unscheduled Maintenance Checks of the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM). Similar to the hard/overweight landing inspection, this post-shimmy inspection would look specifically for cracks at the gusset welds exactly as noted in the Service Bulletin.
On April 12, 2016, based on the potential for damage to the nose landing gear due to loading from non-standard and abusive tug operation, Service Advisory SA16-05, "Aircraft Towing Guidance," was released offering aircraft towing guidance. This guidance includes the following;
On July 14, 2017, Cirrus Design Corporation Service Bulletin SB2X-32-22R1 was issued. The bulletin, which is considered mandatory, was revised to update Compliance, Effectivity, Purpose, Manpower Requirements, and Accomplishment instructions. The bulletin specifically states, "Operators who have successfully complied with the original release of this service bulletin, dated April 12, 2016, must complete Revision 1 of this Service Bulletin in its entirety, and must continue to perform this Service Bulletin every 50 hours thereafter until termination action occurs.
On January 5, 2018, Cirrus Design Corporation Service Bulletin SB2X-32-22R2 was issued. The bulletin, which is considered mandatory, was revised to update Compliance and Effectivity. The bulletin specifically states, "Operators who have successfully complied with the original release of this service bulletin, dated April 12, 2016, must complete Revision 2 of this Service Bulletin in its entirety, and must continue to perform this Service Bulletin every 50 hours thereafter until termination action occurs.
On July 14, 2017, Cirrus Design Corporation Service Bulletin SB2X-32-23, which Cirrus considered to be mandatory, entitled "NOSE GEAR – Nose Wheel Shimmy Reduction," was issued. The bulletin noted that on affected airplanes, nose wheel shimmy may exist on aircraft equipped with Beringer wheels. The bulletin states that a nose tire vibration due to imbalance or tire damage can be mistaken for NLG shimmy. However, it is advisable that both conditions be examined closely and considered tandem during aircraft inspection. The bulletin contains instructions for the adjustment of the nose tire pressure and force required to rotate the nose wheel fork.
On January 5, 2018, Cirrus Design Corporation issued revised Service Bulletin SB2X-32-23R1. The bulletin, which is considered mandatory, was revised to update Effectivity, Purpose, and Accomplishment Instructions. The bulletin states that operators who have successfully complied with the original release of this Service Bulletin, dated July 14, 2017, must complete Revision 1 of this Service Bulletin in its entirety. The Service Bulletin contains instructions for the adjustment of the nose tire pressure and the verification of the force required to rotate the nose wheel fork.
On July 14, 2017, Cirrus Design Corporation issued Cirrus Service Advisory (SA) SA17-08, entitled "Possible Cracking at Nose Land Gear Fillet Welds." The SA revealed that cracks had been discovered on some nose landing gear (NLG) strut assemblies at the fillet welds between the strut tube and the LH and RH gusset tubes. These cracks had led to the collapse of the NLG assemblies. The SA further revealed that each of the aircraft involved had a history of excessive nose wheel shimmy following touchdown of the nose landing gear. The SA defined "nose wheel shimmy" as "a lateral oscillation or wobble of the NLG resulting in a shaking feeling throughout the cabin of the aircraft that can vary in intensity." This is normally encountered during the landing roll-out and will subside as speed is reduced. Cirrus noted in the "Actions" section of the SA that nose wheel shimmy can be reduced or eliminated by lowering the tire pressure. Prior to the next flight, adjust the tire pressure on the nose landing gear to 40 – 50 psi (276 – 344 kPa).
On January 5, 2018, Cirrus Design Corporation issued revised Service Advisory SA17-08R1 (revision 1). The Advisory was issued to update Effectivity and the NLG tire pressure as outlined in SA17-08, dated July 14, 2017. Cirrus noted in the "Actions" section of the SA that nose wheel shimmy can be reduced or eliminated by lowering the tire pressure. Prior to the next flight, adjust the tire pressure on the nose landing gear to 30 – 35 psi (207 – 241 kPa).
Cirrus Aircraft also incorporated specific emphasis and recommendations on how to further discourage shimmying on landing and actions to be taken if the situation occurs on landing in their pilot training program. These incorporations are included in the Landing Standardization Course. Maintenance guidance is also available to mechanics following a shimmy event.
To increase the strength of the weld in the critical area on the nose landing gear, the thickness of the main strut tube was analyzed with an increased wall thickness from 0.125-inch to the full thickness of 0.156-inch. The result of the analysis was an increase (3-5%) in the local stress levels in the static analysis. This design change has been made for all new and replacement gear.
History of Flight
Landing gear collapse (Defining event)
Student Pilot Information
Other Aircraft Rating(s):
Second Pilot Present:
Last FAA Medical Exam:
Last Flight Review or Equivalent:
140 hours (Total, all aircraft), 140 hours (Total, this make and model)
Flight Instructor Information
Flight Instructor; Commercial
Multi-engine Land; Single-engine Land
Other Aircraft Rating(s):
Second Pilot Present:
Airplane Single-engine; Instrument Airplane
Class 1 With Waivers/Limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam:
Last Flight Review or Equivalent:
1000 hours (Total, all aircraft), 390 hours (Total, this make and model), 900 hours (Pilot In Command, all aircraft), 94 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft), 17 hours (Last 30 days, all aircraft)
Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information
CIRRUS DESIGN CORP
SR22T NO SERIES
Year of Manufacture:
Landing Gear Type:
Date/Type of Last Inspection:
Certified Max Gross Wt.:
Time Since Last Inspection:
Airframe Total Time:
PHD VENTURES INC
Operating Certificate(s) Held:
Meteorological Information and Flight Plan
Conditions at Accident Site:
Condition of Light:
Observation Facility, Elevation:
PRB, 839 ft msl
Distance from Accident Site:
0 Nautical Miles
Direction from Accident Site:
Lowest Cloud Condition:
4 knots /
Turbulence Type Forecast/Actual:
Turbulence Severity Forecast/Actual:
30.05 inches Hg
70°C / 37°C
Precipitation and Obscuration:
Santa Monica, CA (SMO)
Type of Flight Plan Filed:
Paso Robles, CA (PRB)
Type of Clearance:
VFR Flight Following
Type of Airspace:
PASO ROBLES MUNI (PRB)
Runway Surface Type:
Runway Surface Condition:
4701 ft / 100 ft
Wreckage and Impact Information
Investigator In Charge (IIC):
Additional Participating Persons:
Mark Mitchell; Federal Aviation Administration; San Jose, CA
Brannon Mayer; Cirrus Aircraft; Duluth, MN
The NTSB did not travel to the scene of this incident.